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It is a well-known fact among theatre scholars that the word ‘theatre’ derives from the Greek 
theatron, meaning ‘a place for seeing’ or ‘a place for viewing’. Maaike Bleeker writes that to 
see ‘is also associated with insight, revelations, prophecy, second sight, and magic. (…) 
Seeing always involves projections, fantasies, desires and fears, and might be closer to 
hallucinating than we think’.1 But what happens when theatre takes place in the pitch-black? 
What insights and revelations occur and what projections and fears are exposed? 
Significantly, how might immersion in the dark affect an audience and how might this impact 
on an audience’s capacity to act in relation to their being acted upon? In short, what kind of 
politics takes place in dark theatre spaces? 
I will be looking at the production of risk, affect and emotion in Lundahl and Seitl’s 
immersive performance for an audience of one, Rotating in a Room of Images (2007); more 
specifically, I will be analysing my own experience of this work, addressing how risk 
perception might contribute to the production of affect and emotion, in turn treating affect 
and emotion as potential participatory risks. This chapter regards the mining of personal 
experience in participatory theatre as a useful and potentially informative method for setting 
about analysis of performer-audience dynamics. As with others in the field approaching this 
kind of work, I employ a ‘critical intimacy’ in approaching Rotating in a Room of Images 
‘from a position of engagement’.2 Imbrication within a performance event as a participant 
does not bar the capacity to make critical observations; eventfulness, after all, is a 
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fundamental part of both witnessing and examining explicitly participatory and less 
participatory theatre and performance.  
Approaching performance from a position of engagement underscores and values the 
importance of subjectivity. This is an especially significant acknowledgment in seeking to 
both represent and analyse an experience of participatory forms of theatre. The experience of 
Rotating in a Room of Images recounted and examined in this chapter stands, I believe, in 
productive contrast to that of Josephine Machon’s also explored in this part of the book. The 
productivity of this contrast testifies to what critical intimacy might emblematise; for 
instance, where Machon reflects on her own anticipatory acts as an audience member in this 
performance in a context of gentility and trust, I consider such acts in a context of risk by 
unpacking my own experience of this work. However, the juxtaposition of these chapters is 
not antagonistic, but complimentary in the context of critically intimate approaches to 
performance. Attempting to document ‘The Experience’ of theatre is perhaps not as fruitful 
as contributing to a plurality of experiences, each demanding different critical tools and 
points of focus.  
The first of this chapter’s two primary claims is that risk perception, affect and emotion might 
be usefully theorised as being entwined in this performance; the second is that a series of 
restrictions on participatory agency arise from this entwinement that characterise the 
interrelations between risk perception, affect and emotion as political. Limits on my own 
capacity to exercise agency will consequently be acknowledged and examined. Perhaps this 
might provide a sobering counterpart to the freedoms that might otherwise be associated with 
participatory theatre.  
I am interested in how cognitive science, especially cognitive psychology and neuroscience, 
might inform an approach to theorising these two claims. However, in doing so, I would like 
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to draw attention to C. P. Snow’s famous 1959 Rede Lecture, ‘The Two Cultures’. In this 
lecture, Snow identified a split between science and the humanities in Western thinking.3 He 
supported equal claims to significance and validity between the two and believed that these 
claims should find adequate institutionalisation in the educational system.4 The methodology 
employed in this chapter bears in mind Snow’s observation and cause which not only remain 
valid, but increasingly significant in the context of metamorphosing disciplines such as 
theatre and performance studies, as well as recent threats to those disciplines.5 There is 
fruitful space to consider how cognitive science might enrich an approach to, for instance, the 
production of affect and emotion in performance. However, it is important not to ignore or 
belittle the value and insight that the humanities have traditionally offered theatre and 
performance studies. With this in mind, I will be citing research arising from cognitive 
science over the past forty years, but especially over the past two decades, as a means of 
informing, but not explaining, an approach to the production of affect and emotion in 
Rotating in a Room of Images: an approach largely documented in the first section of this 
chapter, ‘The Production of Affect and Emotion’. My approach to risk perception, detailed in 
the second section and applied to an analysis of Rotating in a Room of Images, will draw on 
the psychological research of Paul Slovic, in tandem with Antonio Damasio’s neurological 
research into decision making. A concluding section evaluates these findings in political 
terms, drawing on a cognitive reading of agency detection.  
 
The Production of Affect and Emotion 
I attended Rotating in a Room of Images at the Battersea Arts Centre’s One-on-One Festival 
in 2011. On entering the space of this performance, I was asked to wear headphones which 
whispered instructions, mostly dictating when and where to move in the performance space. 
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The space itself was made up of sets of white drapes, forming corridors. The lights faded to 
complete darkness before those whispers encouraged me to stand. When the lights faded back 
up, the orientation of the white drapes had shifted 90 degrees. The lights faded back to black 
and the voice in the headphones prompted me to reach out a hand as another hand, that of an 
unseen performer, took hold, somehow guiding me, the blinded, forward. In moments of 
light, a pair of performers were visible in varying tableaus and proximities; in moments of 
darkness, a sense of threat permeated the space, countered only by the hands of unseen others 
acting as guides. This game of hide and seek, of intermittent light and dark, of 
metamorphosing spaces, of stumbling and being guided through the pitch-black, continued in 
various guises for the fifteen minute duration of the performance.  
What interests me about this piece was my capacity to act as a participant, in relation to my 
being acted upon: in other words, a politics of participation. Immersion in pitch-black has the 
potential to produce affects and emotions which are powerfully felt. In this case, the 
processes which will become the subject of enquiry are the causes of trepidation and fear 
which I felt when stumbling forward in the dark. The suggestion is not that fear must have 
consequently been produced in all other participants (Machon’s chapter in this book suggests 
as much); rather, the suggestion is that exploring some possible causes of affect and emotion 
production might usefully contribute to an understanding of the politics of participation in 
this work. Focus will largely be placed on one aspect of this performance: the experience of 
and movement within a pitch-black theatre space. In particular, fear and trepidation will be 
identified in terms of affect and emotion, assessing how the production of both might impact 
on a theorisation of how agency operates. But what is an affect and what is an emotion?  
Historically, scholarly responses to these questions demonstrate an endless grasping toward 
the origins of affective and emotional experience, as well as the deployment of different 
terminologies and definitions across disciplines and fields.6 This is also where disciplinary 
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limitations rear up for the theatre and performance studies researcher largely depending on 
the retrieval of insights premised on the experiments of others. But what can be offered are 
working definitions which, following a comment from Rhonda Blair at the Affective Science 
and Performance symposium which forms the basis of this book, demonstrate not a ‘doing’ of 
science but a ‘using’ of it. There are methodological issues with this ‘using’, but issues which 
do not block the productive exploration of insights.  
Joseph LeDoux has been influential in examining the production of fear. He suggests that 
fear results primarily from activation of a part of the brain called the amygdala. It is fear that, 
for me, at least, was produced in this performance, albeit a mild and even exciting form of 
fear manifested in trepidation. The amygdala, claims LeDoux, activates behaviours such as 
freezing, fleeing or fighting, ‘autonomic nervous system (ANS) responses (changes in blood 
pressure and heart rate, piloerection, sweating), and hormonal responses’ which may include 
the release of adrenaline into the bloodstream.7 The ANS and hormonal responses, taken 
together, are described by LeDoux as ‘visceral’ responses affecting internal organs and 
glands.  
Visceral processes, as described by LeDoux, have a hand in the production of affect and 
emotion, but they do not tell the whole story. To pinpoint what produced trepidation in 
Rotating in a Room of Images, it is worth defining and distinguishing affect and emotion. As 
I hope to demonstrate, this means that a language can be developed which might aid 
performance analysis while also opening up space to address how cognition impacts on both, 
especially cognitive processes of relevance to the production of individualised responses.  
For Carl Plantinga, visceral processes are the nuts and bolts of affects, defined as ‘felt bodily 
states’.8 This is to be distinguished from emotions which, for Plantinga, are ‘a type of affect 
that involve a higher degree of cognitive processing’ and ‘are clearly identified as intentional 
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mental states’.9 It is worth pointing out that this definition does not banish cognition from 
affective processes, provided that cognition is understood in the broadest possible sense as 
describing ‘any kind of mental operation or structure’, including and especially those which 
are unconscious.10 The word ‘unconscious’ seems to refer here to what John Kihlstrom 
describes as the ‘cognitive unconscious’; this refers to all mental activity which occurs 
without our being aware of it. In other words, most cognitive activity is unconscious.11  
Where affect might be said to constitute a ‘low road’ toward the production of felt bodily 
states,12 emotion involves a more complex form of cognitive appraisal.13 As Mark Johnson 
suggests, emotional responses are ‘bodily processes (with neural and chemical components) 
that result from our appraisal of the meaning and significance of our situation and consequent 
changes in our body state, often initiating actions geared to our fluid functioning within our 
environment’.14 So while both affect and emotion are subject to an ‘embodied mind’ – an 
understanding of mind, briefly, that merges perception with conception – and while both 
might move us toward some kind of action, the role of appraisal has a much firmer hand to 
play in the case of emotion.15  
There are two, related reasons why I have underlined the role of cognition in both affect and 
emotion. The first reason relates to the political implications. As noted, different degrees of 
cognitive activity significantly contribute to the identification of affective and emotional 
sources. But there remains a common cognitive ground to such identification, despite the 
different degrees of cognition. As Magda B. Arnold and J. A. Gasson suggest, ‘an emotion or 
an affect can be considered as the felt tendency toward an object judged suitable, or away 
from an object judged unsuitable, reinforced by specific bodily changes according to the type 
of emotion’.16 In other words, both affect and emotion motivate, whether the result is 
movement or freezing. At this early stage of the chapter, then, a paradoxical quality of agency 
is introduced, so long as agency can be seen to relate to the wilful motivation to do something 
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and the capacity to act upon that motivation. However, it should be noted that affect and 
emotion do not by necessity determine action: there are other conscious and unconscious 
processes that may interfere with any such determination, even with regard to nuancing reflex 
and facial expression.17  
The second reason, which underlies the first, is a consequence of how individuality is figured 
in both. I believe it is a mistake to think of either affect or emotion in terms of hard-wiring 
alone. Damasio acknowledges that emotions, particularly the so-called ‘primary emotions’ 
that have been the concern of evolutionary biologists and psychologists,18 have biologically 
determined elements as a consequence of evolutionary history, but there is also the ‘reality 
that learning and culture alter the expression of emotions and give emotions new meanings’.19 
Individuality and autobiography are not banished from an approach to emotion which draws 
on cognitive science; quite the contrary. Social experiences should inform enquiry into 
emotion, addressed in tandem with what Bruce McConachie calls ‘genetic endowments’.20 
The same seems to be true of affect, particularly in the light of Arnold’s research into 
‘affective memory’. Arnold gives the example of a rider seeing a horse which once threw him 
or her and how this may cause ‘immediate apprehension in the unlucky rider. These reactions 
can only be based on the remembered joy or pain’.21 It is this kind of remembering that, for 
Arnold, constitutes affective memory. She goes on to account for how affective memory 
moves on from a process of remembrance to an imagining of subsequent affective impact and 
an estimation of its potential harmfulness, either conscious or unconscious.22 To sum up: 
through a set of embodied cognitive processes such as these, affect and emotion are revealed 
as distinct processes distinguished by the degree of cognitive activity in play, which 
nonetheless share a common ground in cognition.  
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There are three points that I wish to highlight in this understanding of affect and emotion: the 
first is that affect and emotion are potentially entwined, especially given the fact that 
affective responses are a constituent part of the emotional ‘high road’; the second is that 
instinctual or evolved processes only tell a part of the story in the generation of affective and 
emotional responses. Given the insights offered by cognitive science, individuality and 
autobiography contribute to identifying affective and emotional stimuli, as well as attributing 
meaning to those stimuli which is likely to impact on how they might be felt. The third point 
is that both affect and emotion influence thought and behaviour and thus create limits within 
which agency is likely to operate; the key word here is ‘influence’, as opposed to ‘determine’. 
Another key word is ‘limit’: agency is not necessarily removed from the equation, it is only 
tempered.  
So how might this apply to Rotating in a Room of Images? My ability to move freely through 
the space was restricted by the white curtains, implying that there was a path to be followed, 
as well as a vast number of inputs such as a ‘horizon of expectations’ brought into the space 
and an awareness of and aptitude for participatory protocol.23 However, I want to focus on 
how affect contributed to the negotiation of agency in this performance. As demonstrated 
above, in assessing this contribution it is important to recognise evolved instinct, but it is also 
important to recognise the impact of affective memory and the inputs of individuality and 
autobiography that influence what might be identified as potentially threatening or otherwise 
affectively meaningful.  
The closing off of vision promoted an imaginative engagement with an unknown outside, 
where imagination – that force which, for Johnson, is at the very heart of a meaningful 
encounter with the world – becomes an affectively resonant factor premised on the cognitive 
processes of anticipation, expectation, estimation and evaluation.24 In one sense, as darkness 
descended, my capacity to act upon agency diminished as dependency on an unseen other to 
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be led through the space emerged. But, in another, by virtue of the fact that I was simply 
there in the dark, my participation was almost hyperactively creative, producing against the 
backdrop of darkness a host of imagined stimuli pertinent to the production of affect and 
emotion and therefore pertinent to the operation of agency. Like the child fearing monsters 
under the bed at night, I was positioned by the performance in such a way that affective and 
emotional sources could be called forth from the shadows, ultimately manifested in trips and 
stumbles through the space.  
In the context of pitch-black aesthetic space, affect became something to latch onto, in terms 
of attention and orientation, despite of its paradoxically disorienting qualities.25 The 
invitation to move in pitch-black was met with hesitation, but what emerged from this 
hesitancy was a nodal point in which affect, its more complex emotional form and a largely 
imagined outside – one which I go on to identify in terms of risk – appear entwined. I 
contend that this entwinement can tell us something about the politics of participation.  
 
Risk, Affect and Emotion  
To grope in the dark in Rotating in a Room of Images was to anticipate, or expect and 
imagine what the future will hold: what if I walked into a wall? What if something were to 
jump out at me? It was in these moments of encountering an uncertain future that the 
presence of risk and vulnerability were felt most strongly as something acting on 
participation. This notion of something that is merely perceived – that is, risk – acting on 
participation is complex: it relates to a meshing of risk perception, affect and emotion. 
Although it might, risk does not necessarily equate to the threat of physical harm. Paul Slovic 
identifies risk as a phenomenon which is ‘subjectively defined by individuals who may be 
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influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors’.26 This 
means that just about anything can be perceived as risky, provided that perception relates to 
an evaluation of future-oriented uncertainty. At the heart of risk perception is a ‘distinction 
between reality and possibility’.27 It is this distinction, this gap between the present and an 
anticipated future, which seems to go hand in hand with how affect and emotion are produced 
in the pitch-black in Rotating in a Room of Images: an imaginative iteration of possibility, in 
a context of uncertainty, based on affectively and emotionally charged risk perception.  
It is useful to borrow an observation of Brian Massumi’s to illustrate how this definition of 
risk might relate to Rotating in a Room of Images.28 Massumi asks his reader to think of a 
suitcase which is suspected to be full of anthrax found at an airport, which turns out to be 
nothing more than a suitcase leaking flour; nonetheless, the affective and emotional realities 
produced within individuals by that suitcase, such as fear or anxiety, can bring into being 
their own material realities in a given environment. These ‘material realities’ may include 
SWAT teams, news helicopters, road blocks and the like. Massumi’s observation might just 
as well be applied to Rotating in a Room of Images. An object of risk perception, such as the 
risk of someone leaping out from the dark, or of walking into a wall, might turn out to be 
without, or with minimal threat to safety; a group of performers or stage hands who knew 
exactly where to lead me on a pre-determined path through the space reduced the threat of 
physical harm to a minimum. Nonetheless, the affective and emotional realities produced, 
including fear and trepidation, brought into being other material realities in the present. An 
example here was the manner in which the performer-audience relationship unfolded through 
fumbles and stumbles as well as my affected carving of routes within the routes which were 
already designed prior to entering the space. All this supposes that my encounter with risk, as 
an affective presence culminating in the emotional expressions of fear and trepidation, 
impacted on interaction: with the performers, but also within the pitch-black space. In other 
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words, an encounter with risk exerted affective influence not only over participation, but also 
over the performance given the way that I was subsequently rendered a ‘hyperactively’ 
creative subject. 
What is being dealt with here is a theoretical entwining of risk, emotion and affect: an 
entwining which finds justification in neuroscience. Damasio recognises that there is a 
neurological base to risk perception, or at least the capacity to act upon such perception. In 
different terms, as indicated below, he argues that the human capacity to act effectively on 
risk perception is partly dependent on a part of the brain that inputs emotion into decisions. 
He contends that damage suffered by his patients to regions of the brain associated with 
decision making, including the prefrontal region, produced ‘a disturbance of the ability to 
decide advantageously in situations involving risk and conflict and a selective reduction of 
the ability to resonate emotionally in precisely those same situations, while preserving the 
remainder of their emotional abilities’.29 Damasio is suggesting that that there are 
neurological links between risk perception and emotion, manifested in a reduced capacity to 
make effective decisions in patients suffering from damage to the prefrontal region of the 
brain.  
However, there are also numerous other factors contributing to risk perception. These 
multiple factors include processing of cultural background, affiliation with socio-political 
institutions (including personal values and social values), cognitive-affective inputs 
(including reference knowledge and personal beliefs) and heuristics of information 
processing.30 It is the cognitive-affective inputs that are of special relevance to this chapter. 
Recall Arnold’s example of the rider encountering a horse that has thrown him or her as a 
means of illustrating affective memory: it now emerges that what was being dealt with in that 
discussion was risk perception. The perception of risk is what triggered ‘immediate 
apprehension’.  
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Revisiting and integrating the observations and claims put forward in this chapter so far: the 
production of fear or trepidation and perception of risk, in the context of my own experience 
of Rotating in a Room of Images, demanded an appraisal of the dark as being risky. That 
appraisal may well be strongly influenced by past experiences of the dark, including the 
emotional resonances attributed to those experiences (following Damasio), as well as those 
multiple factors impacting on risk perception just outlined. This means thinking about risk 
perception, affect and emotion not just in terms of hard-wiring, but as processes relating to 
the individual in numerous and profound ways. It should now also be clear how risk might be 
approached as being potentially productive of affect in a performance like Rotating in a 
Room of Images and how risk perception, affect and emotion potentially interrelate.  
I have already established how affect and emotion influenced agentic capacity: but affect and 
emotion might also be regarded as risks for participating audiences that subsequently 
produced comparable effects. By participating in a performance which produced and 
amplified affective and emotional responses, I was opening up to a submissive diminishment 
of control over my own behaviour. It is in this sense that I find it useful to think of affect and 
emotion as risks, provided a partial loss of control is recognised as promoting vulnerability. 
This political concern is the subject of the remaining section. 
 
The Politics of Participation in Rotating in a Room of Images  
The bulk of this chapter has been geared towards establishing how agency functions within 
specific parameters and how these parameters are contingent on exposure to different inputs, 
of which we might count the perception of risk in relation to affect and emotion. The 
remainder of the chapter concerns itself not just with how I, as a participant, was acted upon, 
but also with exploring one particular space left open for action within these parameters. 
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As noted after borrowing from Massumi, risk perception does not in the first instance change 
the material reality of a given environment, but it can change the ways in which that 
environment is perceived and consequently interacted with; it can provide a stimulus for the 
participant to alter the creative trajectory of a performance. This observation will now be 
nuanced by considering how agency might be detected. It may be that an implicitly creative 
subject is at the heart of agency detection: a point that could well position the detection of 
agency as an expression of agency.  
In Rotating in a Room of Images, I found myself anticipating what could appear from the 
dark. Drawing on cognitive development studies, Justin L. Barrett argues that this kind of 
anticipatory process is an innate disposition. He comments on this disposition as a need to 
seek out or attribute agency ‘where further reflection might lead to a different evaluation’, 
referring to that disposition as the Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, or HADD.31 
Along with the anthropologist Stewart Guthrie, he suggests that such a disposition is likely to 
have evolved for survival reasons, for it is better to assume that, for instance, a rustling in the 
bushes is a predator than to forego that assumption and risk attack.32 In this instance, HADD 
attributes agency to something in the bush that might not have posed a risk, but that does not 
stop risk being assumed: an assumption manifested in the production of, for instance, fear and 
the visceral responses accompanying that production which prepare us for flight or defence. 
HADD may account for why environments, generally speaking, occasionally seem infused 
with risk. If the thesis is accepted, then humans are predisposed to render objects of 
perception as ‘risky’ via an attribution of agency.  
It may seem counterintuitive, given this thesis, to claim that agency detection functions also 
as an expression of agency. However, the plot thickens if this assertion is evaluated in the 
light of the claims put forward in this paper. We might add to this disposition Arnold’s notion 
of affective memory, together with Damasio’s recognition of developmental inputs in the 
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identification of emotional sources and an attribution of meaning to those sources, framed in 
the light of risk perception, affect and emotion being entwined. Framed as such, then the 
attribution of agency to uncertain threats is really the projection of an anticipation or 
expectation. That process of attribution, in a fascinating twist, comes from an affected or 
emotionally involved anticipating subject. In Rotating in a Room of Images, then, the 
increasingly fashionable notion in theatre studies, largely derived from Jacques Rancière’s 
essay ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, of thinking about spectatorship as an implicitly active 
process is granted weight, but in a way that recognises the corporeality of this activity.33 This 
assertion does not frame that activity as being the product of instinctual and evolved 
processes alone – although those processes do have a role to play – but, rather, foregrounds 
affective memory and individuality as powerful inputs. Acknowledging attributions of 
agency in a context of uncertainty is itself an expression of agency premised on individuality, 
especially if affects and emotions triggered by risk perception end up prompting negotiation 
of alternative courses of action.  
In conclusion, in my own experience of Rotating in a Room of Images, acts of anticipation in 
a context of uncertainty played a vital role, imagining various threats to be lurking 
somewhere in the unknown: albeit an imagining which may well be premised on amplifying 
the threat of another person simply being proximate. Risk was perceived as permeating the 
space, but the perception of this permeation was the consequence of disposition, on the one 
hand, and imaginatively projecting into that space, on the other. When considered as an 
affective presence, my relationship to risk was political given the influence it exerted; it 
controlled as much as spurred thought and action. An encounter with risk perception, affect 
and emotion, as interrelated phenomena, can consequently be seen as an encounter with the 
capacity to interact with a given situation: an encounter with the limits of agency, as well as a 
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potential minimisation of those limits. In other words, risk perception, affect and emotion can 
be seen to impact on how we might theorise a politics of participation.  
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